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THE CONSTITUTION OF CIVIC VIRTUE FOR
A GOOD SOCIETY
THE CONSTITUTION, CIVIC VIRTUE, AND
CIVIL SOCIETY: SOCIAL CAPITAL AS
SUBSTANTIVE MORALITY
Stephen Macedo*
INTRODUCTION
The central questions to be addressed in this article concern the
Constitution's dependence on civic virtue in citizens, the role of civil
society institutions in fostering that virtue, and the implications for
normative diversity wvithin the overall constitutional order. The
trajectory of my argument will be as follows. I believe that the well-
working of our constitutional order depends upon the prevalence of
certain civic virtues in the citizenry. It may be that the political order
can and will survive the decline of civic virtue, but a price will be paid
in terms of the ability of our political order to improve: the
prevalence of civic virtues may be less important to political stability
and economic prosperity than to the constitutional pursuit of justice
and other ideal ends. I am convinced that civil society institutions
play a crucial role in fostering civic virtue, and that this recognition
justifies a variety of political interventions in civil society, including
those implicit in the establishment of the constitutional order itself.
Finally, these interventions seem to me to have profound implications
for the sorts of deep normative diversity-including religious
diversity-that we should expect to flourish in our regime. In sum, if
it is right that our liberal democratic constitutional order is to be
understood as a shared normative project dedicated to the pursuit of
ideal ends like justice, then the question is: how do our institutions-
including, but not only, specifically educative institutions-provide or
fail to provide for the virtues that facilitate the success of this project?
Our political and constitutional institutions may sometimes provide
* Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics and the University Center for Human
Values, Director of the Program on Law and Public Affairs Princeton University.
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for civic virtue indirectly: by shaping social relations and civil society
institutions that are themselves morally educative.
My response to the broad questions that have been set for us will be
in some ways fairly narrow. I will begin by addressing the role of civil
society institutions within our constitutional order, and will do so by
focusing on Robert D. Putnam's important account of social capital.
His discussion highlights two themes of capital importance: first, the
dependence of the constitutional order of an extended republic on
sub-communities and associations, and second, the importance for the
constitutional order of shaping or constituting those sub-associations
in its own image and for its own purposes (not entirely but
importantly). Putnam's argument is not that groups, associations, and
social networks are good; it is in effect more subtle and problematic
than that. Implicit in his account is a distinctive and substantive social
ideal: an account of civic virtues and the good society, which are
constituted and supported by certain kinds of groups and particular
patterns of group life. I will not take up the much debated question of
whether "social capital" is in decline. I leave that question aside in
order to bring out the substantive distinctiveness of the ideal of civil
society prefigured in Putnam's account of social capital. The
distinctiveness of this ideal raises deep questions about the place of
social and normative diversity in a liberal democratic constitutional
order. Were Putnam simply promoting a bland diet of "sociability"
the diversity problem would not arise (the question would then be:
why should we expect that participation in groups tends to support
specifically liberal democratic virtues?'). As we shall see, however,
when civil society is understood as a substantive social ideal-one
containing resources that advance a specifically liberal democratic
project-then many associations, groups, and social networks will not
qualify as contributors to civil society. Indeed, in this case we will find
that the institutional structures and public policies that promote
"good" forms of social capital tend to have a deeply non-neutral
impact on particular associations, including religious associations.
The problems I want to explore arise directly from basic
constitutional principles. Freedom of association is a basic right and
freedom of religious association is guarded with political intensity.
Can public policy promote better rather than worse forms of
community and association while respecting freedom of association?
If we promote a particular ideal of civil society through public policy,
1. See Sheri Berman, Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic, 49
World Pol. 401 (1997) (noting that participation in associations, combined with a
weak central government, led to a breakdown in German society). See also the
excellent critical discussion of the ambiguity of "civil society revivalism" in Linda C.
McClain & James E. Fleming, Some Questions for Civil Society Revivalists,
Symposium on Legal and Constitutional Implications of the Calls to Revive Civil
Society, 75 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 301 (2000).
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do we violate constitutional or moral obligations that government
should remain neutral toward private associative choices, especially
choices among religious associations? How far can government go in
favoring better rather than worse forms of community when the better
and worse features of these different communities directly implicate
religious differences?
I want, therefore, to emphasize the deeply non-neutral dimensions
of an ideal of civil society directed toward the promotion of
specifically liberal democratic civic virtues. In describing the ideal
form of a liberal democratic civil society, and suggesting that we
should make plans to bring it about, Putnam argues, in effect, that
public policy should favor regime-supporting forms of association,
including religious association. This is a deeply non-neutral agenda,
and I don't see how this can be avoided by any critical account of civil
society that seeks to use associations and groups to promote civic
virtues.
These conflicts-arising from the desire to promote a civically
healthy society on the one side and, on the other side, the desire to
respect freedom and diversity-are being brought into sharp focus by
proposals that would extend the already widespread practice of
channeling public monies to faith-based institutions that help
administer social welfare programs. A huge array of government
services are already administered by faith-based non-profit
organizations.2 Religiously-based organizations form a substantial
portion of the non-profit sector: religiously-based hospitals, nursing
homes, schools, and social service programs are vital social service
deliverers in the United States, and they are, like other non-profits,
heavily dependent on public monies. Many school voucher proposals
would invite religious communities to take control of another large
and extremely important swath of public policy. Meanwhile, the
"Charitable Choice" provision attached to the 1996 welfare reform
2. As of 1992, there were 1.4 million non-profit associations in the United States.
In 1990, non-profit associations earned a total estimated income of S316 billion. The
non-profit sector employs 11% of the American workforce, or 16 million people. This
sector includes a majority of American hospitals, and a substantial portion of our
nursing homes and educational institutions, as well as the bulk of social service
delivery. Non-profit organizations are deeply dependent on government funding.
which comprises 31% of the sector's total income. Religiously-based institutions
compose a substantial portion of the non-profit social service sector. Consider the
striking fact that government funding accounts for 75% of the annual budget of the
Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York: $1.75 billion. Nearly S200 million a year
goes to Catholic Relief Services from various government contracts and grants.
Prominent Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant groups receive large portions of their
revenues from government sources. See Stephen V. Monsma, When Sacred and
Secular Mix: Religious Non-profit Organizations and Public Money 3-4, 10 (1996).
Stephen Bates reports similar findings for non-sectarian charities: 60% of the
revenues for "Save the Children" are government provided, 78% for CARE, and
80% for the United Cerebral Palsy Association. Stephen Bates. National Service:
Getting Things Done?, A Cantigny Conference Series Special Report 45 (1996).
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legislation could make it harder for public regulations to influence the
ways that religious institutions deliver publicly funded services.
Opponents of these developments worry that public monies are being
used to subsidize religious activities, including proselytizing and
perhaps (under voucher schemes) indoctrination. On the other hand,
many proponents welcome these developments, including easing
regulations on faith-based institutions. If government wants to enter
into partnerships with faith-based social service organizations, it
should respect the autonomy and integrity of its religious partners.
The strings that come attached to public monies-in the form of
regulations-should therefore be kept to a minimum.
These concerns with the religious autonomy and integrity of
publicly funded faith-based welfare agencies have been ably
articulated in recent books by Stephen V. Monsma and Charles L.
Glenn.4 Monsma and Glenn urge greater appreciation and support
for the work being done by publicly funded faith-based organizations.
They object, however, to the "non-neutrality" of public principles that
brand some religious institutions as more worthy of public support
than others. They argue that an excess of regulations, conditions on
funding, and pressures toward professionalization undermine the
autonomy and integrity of faith-based organizations. They question
the Supreme Court's oft-expressed concern that public funds should
not flow to "pervasively sectarian" organizations, or organizations
whose ethos expresses "sectarian exclusivity." They condemn the
"non-neutrality" toward different faiths that is expressed in such
sentiments, which they find running through not only court opinions
but various forms of government regulation. Glenn charges that the
government uses the term "sectarian" unfairly to cast aspersions on
"the wrong kind of religion," and to exclude some religious
communities from the delivery of publicly-funded social services.'
I am not going to address these issues in detail.6 Instead, I will focus
on the apparent implications of Putnam's project for these general
3. According to Charles L. Glenn, the "Charitable Choice provision requires
that, if states choose to contract for social services with federal welfare funds, they
must allow faith-based organizations to compete on equal terms and may not impose
conditions that affect their religious practices." Charles L. Glenn, The Ambiguous
Embrace: Government and Faith-Based Schools and Social Agencies 8 (2000). The
provisions of Charitable Choice, however, are fairly complex: it mandates that
religious institutions must be allowed to maintain a religious environment by
displaying religious symbols, and they retain the right to use religious criteria in
hiring, firing and disciplining employees, but they remain subject to other anti-
discrimination laws. They may not discriminate against clients on the basis of
religion, and they may not require beneficiaries to participate in any religious
exercise. Federal contract funds may not be used to pay for worship services,
sectarian instruction, or proselytization. Id. at 107-10.
4. See Monsma, supra note 2; Glenn, supra note 3.
5. Glenn, supra note 3, at 82-83.
6. I have addressed Monsma's version of some of these charges elsewhere in
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charges. The non-neutrality of which Glenn complains, and indeed
the bias against "sectarianism," turns out to be integral to how civil
society supports liberal democracy.
I. THE NORMATIVITY AND PARTICULARITY OF "SOCIAL CAPITAL"
Robert D. Putnam's recent work seems to me a signal contribution
to our understanding of what it takes to promote a good society within
a liberal democratic constitutional framework. His account has
distinctive normative implications, combining liberal and
communitarian values: the healthy civic order is a regime of liberal
communities. This account has decided implications for the forms of
diversity that will flourish within the liberal democratic constitutional
framework of an extended republic.
Consider two statements about religious communities and their
relation to a healthy democracy. The first comes from Putnam's
famous study of good government in Italy, Making Democracy Work.
He found:
Membership rates in hierarchically ordered organizations (like the
Mafia or the institutional Catholic Church) should be negatively
associated with good government; in Italy, at least, the most devout
churchgoers are the least civic-minded. All these expectations are
consistent with the evidence of this study .... Good government in
Italy is a by-product of singing groups and soccer clubs, not prayer.'
And as Putnam puts it elsewhere in his study of Italian democracy,
"Organized religion, at least in Catholic Italy, is an alternative to the
civic community, not a part of it.... In today's Italy, as in the Italy of
Machiavelli's civic humanists, the civic community is a secular
community."8
A very different note is sounded at the end of Putnam's more
recent book, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American
Community:
I challenge America's clergy, lay leaders, theologians, and ordinary
worshippers: Let us spur a new, pluralistic, socially responsible
"great awakening," so that by 2010 Americans will be more deeply
engaged than we are today in one or another spiritual community of
meaning, while at the same time becoming more tolerant of the faiths
and practices of other Americans.9
What is notable about this summons to revivalism is that it both
Stephen Macedo, Constituting Civil Society: School Vouchers, Religious NonProfit
Organizations, and Liberal Public Values, 75 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 417 (2000).
7. Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modem
Italy 175-76 (1993) [hereinafter Putnam, Making Democracy Work].
& Id. at 107-09.
9. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American
Community 409 (2000) (italics in original) [hereinafter Putnam, Bowling Alone].
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recognizes that "[f]aith-based communities remain.., a crucial
reservoir of social capital," and equally that not every form of
religious enthusiasm contributes to the public good." The desired
revivalism will be "pluralistic [and] socially responsible" and "at the
same time" even "more tolerant" than are today's religious
communities."
There is an exquisite balancing act packed into these statements,
that I want to explore. This balancing act in effect seems to me
essential to the success of the liberal democratic constitutional
experience. Although Putnam's account is not anti-religious, it does
insist that not all religious communities contribute to the civic health
of a liberal democratic order. Some religions (like the more
traditional forms of Roman Catholicism) seem to undermine at least
some important civic virtues, especially the civic virtues of generalized
cooperativeness that, as we shall see, are of greatest concern to
Putnam. Religious communities may or may not contribute to civil
society, when civil society is understood as the set of communities,
patterns of association, and personal attitudes that contribute to the
well-working of liberal democracy.
But what is "social capital" and what does it imply about the good
society and civic virtue? Societies are high in social capital when
trusting attitudes prevail and cooperative activities abound among
citizens. The phrase is meant to identify a central feature of good
citizenship and the importance of social networks to sustaining it:
virtuous citizens are active in cooperative groups, associations, and
social networks. They are personally connected and ready to take
part in collective endeavors. "[C]ivic virtue is most powerful when
embedded in a dense network of reciprocal social relations.",2
Groups and associations are important as venues in which individuals
learn to be trustworthy. In such venues, cooperative individuals earn
the friendship and esteem of their peers, and the reputation for
reliability invites the trusting cooperation of others. Groups,
associations, and social networks nurture cooperation by bringing
individuals into repeated interaction. In a society with thick networks
of groups and associations individuals will have many opportunities to
offer to cooperate with others, and to accept or spurn offers of
cooperation. Their confederates will likewise have many
opportunities to witness or hear about these transactions.
Reputations can be built up or made to suffer, and where social
networks are dense, information spreads more easily and widely,
10. Id. at 408.
11. Id. at 409 (emphasis omitted).
12. Id. at 19.
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providing individuals with an incentive to exhibit qualities that make
them eligible for future cooperative endeavors. 3
Virtuous citizens on this account actively manifest their
cooperativeness in social activities and networks of all kinds: formal
and informal, civic, cultural, and recreational. This connectedness
yields direct and specific benefits to individuals, as well as benefits to
uninvolved third parties, and the democratic society at large.
Participation in social networks provides specific benefits to people
looking for jobs, for example, as well as aid in dealing with various
personal or social problems. When individuals develop and utilize
contacts in this way, it becomes more likely that they will be enlisted
in helping others. In a society with lots of social networks, the failure
to reciprocally assist others or the propensity to shirk one's
responsibilities are more likely to become widely known. A society
with fairly dense social networks is, therefore, favorable to the
emergence of generalized norms of reciprocity: individuals are more
likely to do their part knowing that others are also doing their part.
Where such a generalized norm exists, it makes sense to trust other
people in general. A general norm of trustworthiness makes social
and economic endeavors of all sorts more efficient, as people do not
need to spend resources monitoring each other and enforcing rules.
Indeed, they need not resort as frequently to legal action. There are
wider civic benefits as well. Those who are socially connected seem to
play a more active and informed role in various sorts of civic and
political activities: they are more likely to read the newspaper and
stay informed, and the very existence of social connections helps
transmit information about the problems of other people. 4
All of this seems to be quite plausible, and Putnam musters a great
deal of theory and evidence in his two books to make the case for
these propositions in the context of democratic practice. I will not try
to prove these claims here, rather I will use them as a plausible way of
fleshing out the now very old and widespread belief that the well-
being of modem mass democracies depends in part on the vigor of the
associations, groups, and social networks that exist within society-a
belief advanced by thinkers from Adam Smith to Alexis de
Tocqueville, to Emile Durkheim, to much of the post-World War II
"mass society" and civic culture literature in social science (as well as
Catholic social thought and the idea of "subsidiarity"). Indeed, the
controversial substantive features of Putnam's social ideal are also
rooted in these older accounts. 5
13. Putnam, Making Democracy Work, supra note 7, at 170-73. For some
important observations on these matters, see Philip Pettit, The Cunning of Trust, 24
Phil. & Pub. Aff. 202,202-25 (1995).
14. Putnam, Bowling Alone, supra note 9, at 288-90.
15. I have explored some of these sources in Stephen Macedo, Communiy;
Diversity, and Civic Education" Toward a Liberal Political Science of Group Life, 13
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Putnam argues that participation in groups and social networks of
many kinds is declining. For example, it is well known that
participation in politics and many community and civic associations
has declined over the last 35 years. In politics, Putnam argues that
political moderates, in particular, are participating less, thus leaving
the field to ideological extremists at both ends of the spectrum.16 In
addition, he finds declining participation in clubs and civic
organizations,17 and even cites evidence that people are "schmoozing"
less: they have less contact with their neighbors, play cards less, bowl
in leagues less frequently, and it is less common for families to eat
meals together.18 Furthermore, charitable giving as a percentage of
income, though not as a total dollar amount, is down; but volunteering
is up among the young, perhaps because of service programs in
schools (or as a "rational choice" colleague suggested to me, because
college admissions officers now put more emphasis on "service"
related activities).19 People's trust in one another has also declined a
great deal, and various measures of incivility are up (one thing drivers
are giving more of than they used to is "the finger."2 ) The causes of
declining participation, sociability, trust, and civility are complex, but
appear to include (according to Putnam) rising pressures of time and
money, suburbanization and sprawl, more time spent commuting, the
rise of privatized and isolated forms of entertainment (especially TV
viewing), and the passing of older generations whose civic
enthusiasms were heightened by the shared experience of World War
11.21
All of this adds up to a picture of a steep decline in social
connectedness and trust in the last third of the 20th century. Putnam
depicts this with energy and imagination (though I am sure debates
will rage around his claims). The alleged consequences for individual
and social well-being are extensive and serious. Putnam cites striking
evidence that connected, socially active people lead much happier and
healthier lives. Places that are high in social capital have low
mortality rates from disease, low crime rates, low rates of cheating on
taxes, and these places are higher in indices of child health, welfare,
and education (in high social capital states, such as Minnesota,
Garrison Keiller is right, all the children are above average). Though
the country as a whole is witnessing a decline in social capital, indexes
vary widely across the states. As a nation we are becoming less like
Minnesota, Vermont, and Utah, and more like Mississippi, Louisiana,
Soc. Phil. & Pol'y, 240 (1996).
16. Putnam, Bowling Alone, supra note 9, at 31-47, 336-49.
17. Id. at 48-64 (discussing trends of civic participation in the twentieth century).
18. Id. at 93-115.
19. Id. at 116-33.
20. Id. at 142-44.
21. Id. at 277-84.
22. Id. at 326-35.
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and Georgia (states that represent the high and low ends of social
capital respectively).'
I do not want to belabor Putnam's argument, or his claims about
declining social capital. I want to focus instead on the substantive
vision of a well-working democracy that this account implies.
Putnam's concerns, as stated thus far, are liable to sound
unobjectionable even if somewhat exaggerated. Who is against
cooperation? Not to mention good health, a long life, and an active
citizenry? But what, we want to ask, is the specific payoff of this
account for a liberal democratic constitutional order? Why should we
think that the account of social capital is especially relevant to the
questions at hand, namely, civic virtue in a liberal democratic
constitutional order in particular? There are in fact features of
Putnam's story that draw it close to the substantive needs of our
constitutional project. One crucial feature is the emphasis on
generalized reciprocity.
In his book on Italy, Putnam emphasized the importance of "cross-
cutting" associations and memberships. According to Putnam, social
cleavages and associational boundaries should not constantly overlap
and reinforce each other. If they do, divisions in society will run very
deep, and cooperative trusting relations across society are liable to be
impossible. Where social divisions and group memberships are
complex and cross-cutting (rather than reinforcing) broad forms of
cooperativeness are far more likely. Individuals in complex cross-
cutting social networks are more likely to be open to new and broader
forms of association.24
Deep social cleavages are liable to reinforce and be reinforced by
vertical patterns of authority. Where individuals are distrustful and
unengaged with others or engaged only in narrow tribalistic or deeply
bounded groupings, they are liable to need to look upward to
centralized authorities to settle disputes. In civic regions, on the other
hand, where cooperation and trust are widespread and cut across
group lines, authority tends to be horizontal. Consequently, norms
emerge out of ordinary social interactions, and fewer rules need to be
imposed from above. Cooperation may first develop out of the
primordial bonds of families, kinship ties, inward looking tribes and
villages, but social capital-the generalized reciprocity that supports
liberal democratic civic virtues-will tend to be broad and somewhat
weak, to "cut across social cleavages" and "nourish wider
cooperation." 5 Or, as Mark Granovetter puts it, "[w]eak ties are
23. Id. at 287-95.
24. Putnam, Making Democracy Work, supra note 7. at 86-98.
25. Id. at 175.
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more likely to link members of different small groups than are strong
ones, which tend to be concentrated within particular groups." Hence
Granovetter's oft-quoted emphasis on "the strength of weak ties." 6
The same point is made in Putnam's more recent account, where he
stresses the difference between "bonding" and "bridging"
associations. Bonding associations appear as the more primitive form:
they are "inward looking and tend to reinforce exclusive identities and
homogeneous groups. Examples... include ethnic fraternal
organizations, church-based women's reading groups, and fashionable
country clubs."'27 Bonding associations tend to be exclusive, and to
heighten distinctions between insiders and outsiders. "Bridging"
associations are more specifically attuned to the values and virtues
required by a liberal democratic social order: they are "outward
looking and encompass people across diverse social cleavages.
Examples... include the civil rights movement, many youth service
groups, and ecumenical religious organizations."28
Bonding associations have their uses. The intensity of the bonds
they sustain can provide "crucial social and psychological support for
less fortunate members of the community," and might also induce
people to take risks on fellow members that outsiders would not, such
as providing start-up financing.29 Although bonding associations
cannot be altogether left behind, their exclusivity makes them
intrinsically problematic in a liberal democratic context. Bonding
social capital "bolsters our narrower selves," and "by creating strong
in-group loyalty, may also create strong out-group antagonism."3
Accordingly, bonding social capital is sometimes harmful. Bridging
social capital, on the other hand, is always to be welcomed: it is an
unambiguous good because it generates all the benefits of social
cooperation as well as "broader identities and reciprocity."',
Putnam does not make much of the fact, but he is obviously sorting
and ranking basic human goods. Our liberal democratic constitutional
order as a whole stands, after all, for particular goods and values, such
as social peace, tolerance and individual freedom, equality of respect
among persons, friendship and cooperation among all citizens,
commercial prosperity, and (at least once all these are secured)
political moderation. Particular religious and moral visions often
come into conflict with these goods. For instance, material success
and worldliness may be seen as corrupting, and a great emphasis on
equality of respect among citizens may be seen as at odds with the
26. Id. (quoting Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 Am. J. Soc.,
1360, 1376 (1973)).
27. Putnam, Bowling Alone, supra note 9, at 22.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 23.
31. Id.
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judgmentalism needed to sustain a commitment to severe forms of
self-control and the renunciation of worldly pleasures. There are
communities of people who do what they can to maintain
boundedness around their lives and communities in order to support
ethical visions at odds with mainstream values: they will not place a
high value on broad social cooperation and reciprocity. Indeed,
religious communities that view today's popular culture as essentially
corrupt are unlikely to celebrate "the strength of weak ties." Weak
ties turn out to be "strong" only when it comes to mainstream forms
of "success," like getting a job. Networks of "weak ties" remain
pitifully weak when it comes to supporting efforts to live up to
demanding traditional sexual and moral codes concerning such things
as the permanence of marriage, the wrongness of pre-marital sex, and
other matters that are counter to the cultural mainstream. Weak ties
link all citizens together in networks of reciprocal cooperation,
bridging potentially deep social cleavages, and promoting comity and
political moderation, but all of these good things seem likely to come
at the "cost" (if one regards it as a cost) of drawing us all into a shared
and fluid cultural milieu.
II. How SOCIAL CAPITAL SUPPORTS SPECIFICALLY LIBERAL
DEMOCRATIC VIRTUES
In what ways is this account of civic virtue (which Putnam ably
articulates and elaborates, but did not invent) especially appropriate
to a modem, extended, liberal democratic commercial republic such
as ours?
I argued at the beginning of this article that our constitutional order
seems to depend upon certain widespread civic virtues. I would not
argue, however, that our constitution depends upon the sorts of
demanding virtues promoted by some versions of classical or civic
republicanism. It might be noble for citizens to develop traits of
character that lead them to put aside their self-interest whenever it
comes into conflict with principles based on the good of all.
Demanding, self-interest-denying forms of civic virtue will not easily
be reconciled with liberty, as Madison rightly emphasized in Federalist
No. 10. If we wish to preserve liberty, then we should prefer forms of
civic virtue that do not require us to make war upon (though they may
require us to temper, broaden, and elevate) the core tendencies of
free self-governing individuals in a modern, commercial polity such as
ours.
It is significant, therefore, that the virtues that Putnam seeks to
promote are not too far removed from the requirements of a
prosperous economy and a diverse and extended liberal society. The
central motive upon which his account rests is not altruism but
reciprocity. What is good for society on this account also appears to
be good for the self-interested individual. On the one hand, isolation
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leads to depression, health problems, a shorter life, and a tougher
road to economic advancement. On the other hand, scheming
selfishness is really not the best way to get ahead, at least in favorable
social circumstances (where there are enough social networks to
reward cooperatives). Or maybe we should put it this way: it is not
unrealistic to think that by promoting social capital, we can create a
social environment in which cultivating the virtues of cooperativeness
are the best bet for the self-interested individual. Putnam has
forwarded an account of civic virtue that is motivationally realistic and
consistent with overarching constitutional commitments to freedom
and equality in a commercial republic.
"Social capital" also has inclusive and egalitarian aspects. It is most
bountiful where there is a prevalent norm of "generalized
reciprocity," that is, where citizens trust people in general, and not
only their particular groups of confederates: where their
cooperativeness is not limited to their long-time neighbors, or fellow
parishioners, their union brothers and sisters, their fellow Irishmen, or
any other particular affiliation or identity. Social capital begins in
particular associations and local social networks, but at its best it
transcends these limitations: virtuous citizens on this model are
willing to trust and cooperate with everyone, or at least with all who
are prepared reciprocally to exhibit trusting cooperation (all of one's
fellow citizens if we consider a particular country, but there is no
reason why cooperative patterns should not extend beyond national
borders).2 Moreover, in regions characterized by low social capital,
class differences are also exacerbated. 33
Putnam admits that associations and social networks are not always
good, and he is certainly right. One of the great worries about the
revival of concern with groups and associations is that these partial
loyalties could detract from our most inclusive loyalties, the widest
forms of tolerance. The key is to promote generalized reciprocity, or
an openness to trusting cooperation with any and all. Putnam
emphasizes that the most intolerant individuals tend to be socially
isolated. The important claim here is that liberalism-broad attitudes
of tolerance-and strong communities (of a certain sort at least) tend
to go together. Generalized reciprocity builds democratic forms of
community- encompassing all citizens-at the expense of intense
shared commitments among sub-communities, whether religious,
racial, ethnic, or otherwise.
One might worry that promoting people's embeddedness in social
groups and associations could undermine individual freedom.
Embeddedness in groups could fix people's identities, at least if that
32. Id. at 20-22 (emphasizing generalized reciprocity); Putnam, Making
Democracy Work, supra note 7, at 182-83 (same).
33. Putnam, Making Democracy Work, supra note 7, at 111.
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embeddedness is very deep. Such sometimes seems to be the case
with the "constitutive commitments" that Michael J. Sandel has
recommended as an alternative to liberalism: these are commitments
that define us more deeply than our capacities for critical reflection
and choice. 4 But here again, Putnam's "communitarianism" remains
firmly liberal. According to his ideal, individuals are embedded in a
multiplicity of cross-cutting ties and affiliations, and the complexity of
commitments thus created, and the conflicts among various
affiliations, helps sustain both individual freedom and the capacity for
critical reflectiveness on one's particular commitments. This trait is
important not only for freedom but for our capacity to think about
what justice requires in a diverse society. Where multiple communal
affiliations do not overlap and reinforce each other, they do not bar
critical reflection and choice but spur critical reflection and choice.
Liberal individuals are not best understood as atomistically isolated
from social ties, but rather as complexly committed to a variety of
associations and affiliations whose sometimes conflicting demands call
for critical consideration, reflection, and judgment. So, Putnam's ideal
of civil society is consistent with, and indeed supportive of, liberal
freedom and the character traits of critical reflectiveness associated
with liberal justice. Of course, the fact that multiple commitments
elicit critical reflection also means that free individuals are not deeply
or ineluctably committed to anything: a secure identity is not given,
unshakeable beliefs are not easily available. A certain shallowness of
commitment may go along with this model of freedom, and some will
see that shallowness as the unattractive corollary of Putnam's jaunty
celebration of "the strength of weak ties.""-
Putnam's view seems to me to conform with distinct and substantive
liberal democratic values and virtues:
- it rests on realistic links with commercial self-interest (at both the
individual and collective level): trustful individuals and societies are
more efficient and prosperous;
- it is egalitarian and inclusive: it pushes citizens toward regarding
everyone as a potential cooperator-the test is behavioral, not
ascriptive;
- it is consistent with liberal tolerance: the right sorts of community
memberships enhance tolerance;
- it is consistent with liberal freedom: cross-cutting and complex
memberships promote the fluidity of individual commitments, and the
maintenance of a critical perspective on group-based values;
- it promotes the pursuit of justice: it is consistent with critical
34. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982).
35. I argue for the centrality of multiple commitments and critical distance on
one's commitments, by way of responding to communitarian and civic republican
critics of liberalism, in Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community in Liberal
Constitutionalism (1990).
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reflectiveness, and it promotes knowledge of the circumstances of
others, and active engagement in social causes;
- it promotes democratic political activity and knowledge (as
Putnam emphasizes, though I have not) as well as moderation and
willingness to compromise.
Putnam's is a liberal-democratic account of the virtues: it promotes
liberal democratic individuals and supporting community structures.
There is nothing particularly new here, but this is a useful account of
the importance of particular social structures to liberal democratic
civic virtues, one that is already proving to be influential.
III. SOCIAL CAPITAL, RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES, AND NORMATIVE
DIVERSITY
Religious communities like any other community, can tend in the
direction of either bonding or bridging, with the latter being the more
inclusive, civic, and liberal democratic in orientation. In his study of
Italy, Putnam found that the uncivic regions are more traditionally
Catholic: where church attendance is high, divorce is rejected, and
religious marriages are strongly favored over civil ones, rates of civic
participation are low. 6 The civic regions were characterized both by
greater evidence of secularism, but also by stronger lay involvement in
religious affairs. 7 Traditional Catholicism and clericalism promote
hierarchical patterns of authority and dampen civic activity, whereas
in the civic regions authority tends to flow horizontally across
congregations and citizens themselves.38
In his study of America, Putnam found that mainline Protestant and
Catholic churches seem to help mobilize civic engagement. They have
the qualities of bridging associations. Instead of monopolizing their
congregants attention or discouraging wider social involvements,
members of these communities tend to become involved in helping to
lead secular civic groups. Putnam found the mainline churches
(Protestant and Catholic) to be schools of liberal democratic civic
engagement. Evangelical churches, on the other hand, tend to be
more exclusive bonding associations. They invest their social capital
"at home more than in the wider community,"39 they work to
reinforce "life-style boundaries within the dominant culture,"4 and
their members do not tend to become active leaders in wider civic
associations. They are more concerned with reaffirming their faith
36. Putnam, Making Democracy Work, supra note 7, at 107-09.
37. Id. at 127.
38. Id. at 173.
39. Putnam, Bowling Alone, supra note 9, at 77.
40. Id. (quoting Wade Clark Roof, America's Voluntary Establishment. Mainline
Religion in Transition, in Religion and America: Spiritual Life in a Secular Age 132,
134 (Mary Douglas & Steven Tipton eds., 1983).
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and less concerned with bettering the larger society.4 Fundamentalist
and evangelical churches offer more intense forms of communal
commitment, but this inward-looking intensity seems positively to
discourage investments in efforts to improve the wider society.
Conservative congregations offer fewer "social outreach services or
programs."'4 Strikingly, while black church involvement has always
been regarded as essential to the mobilization for civil rights, the story
was not so simple: "black civic engagement was positively correlated
with involvement in mainline black churches, but negatively
associated with involvement in black fundamentalist
denominations."43  In sum, two trends with respect to church
attendance in America bode ill for social engagement and civic virtue:
the decline of ("more worldly") mainline denominations, and the
revitalization of evangelical churches, which Putnam describes as "an
insurgent, more disciplined, more sect-like, less 'secularized' religious
movement."'
With the reappearance of that nasty word "sect," let us recall
Charles L. Glenn's complaint that it is, in effect, no more than a way
for courts and other public agencies to discriminate arbitrarily against
the "wrong" (socially marginalized? or less popular?) religious
communities. Is a discriminating, critical stance toward differing
churches and faiths arbitrarily or defensibly discriminatory? Here
again is Glenn (quoting an article by Richard A. Baer entitled "The
Supreme Court's Discriminatory Use of the Term 'Sectarian'):
"Throughout American history,... 'sectarian' has been used to
exclude and to ostracize. It is a term used to disparage and
marginalize particular groups of Americans and particular kinds of
thinking.... [It] always implies that there exists a contrasting
mainstream, a right way of thinking, a common position that
deserves to be accepted by everyone. ' 4-
But, Glenn observes, "Baer argues that the Supreme Court's use of
sectarian is by no means neutral."' Indeed I'm sure it is not, but let us
get back to Baer:
Thus the Court refers to 'sectarian exclusivity,' 'narrower sectarian
purposes,' 'sectarian division,' 'sectarian controversies,' 'political
fragmentation on sectarian lines,' and 'sectarian bickering and
strife.' Terms such as 'bitter controversies,' 'proselytizing function,'
and 'bias' are closely conjoined with the term 'sectarian.'...
41. Id. at 77-79.
42. Id. at 78.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 77.
45. Glenn, supra note 3, at 82 (quoting Richard A. Baer, Jr., The Supreme Court's
Discriminatory Use of the Term "Sectarian," 6 J. L & Pol. 449,449-51 (1990)).
46. Id (italics in original).
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Conversely, the Court uses more neutral or even positive language
in conjunction with the terms 'secular' and 'nonsectarian.' 47
Glenn joins Baer in complaining of the arbitrariness and unfairness of
the concern with sect-like churches: the pejorative "sectarian" is
applied simply to "'the wrong kind of religion."'48
I do not want to survey and assess the accuracy of this account of
the Supreme Court's use of the category of sectarianism, but rather
would suggest that (insofar as Glenn's account is correct) the Court
may be on to something constructive, contrary to what Glenn seems
to think. According to Glenn, the use of "sectarian" as a pejorative
term in the courts follows in the footsteps of Thomas Jefferson,
Horace Mann, and others who preferred "rational and moralistic"
versions of Protestantism freed from the "superstition" of traditional
forms of religiosity. Jefferson, Mann, and others take the stance they
do in politics, Glenn seems to assume, because they desired to
advance the true religion, as they understood it. What we can now
see, in light of our discussion of Putnam, is that there is a political or
civic case for being concerned about "sect-like" communities of all
sorts, whether religious or otherwise.
The case against sects emerges under the rubric of an analysis of
"bonding" associations. The qualities that have been ascribed to
"sectarian" organizations, by Glenn and Baer's account, track pretty
well the worrisome qualities that Putnam ascribes to "bonding"
associations. They are all qualities that encourage the inward-looking
concern with doctrinal matters at the expense of wider forms of social
cooperation and a focus on the engagement with social problems
("exclusivity," "narrowness," encouraging "division," preoccupied
with "sectarian controversy," etc.).
There is a civic basis for the concern with "sect-like" communities.
Putnam articulates it, but he has hardly invented it. Regulations and
policies that reflect the "bias" against sect-like communities will
indeed have non-neutral impacts on differing faiths and religious
communities and organizations, but insofar as the justification is civic,
it will not be so easy to say that the policies are simply arbitrary and
unfair.4 9
47. Id. (quoting Baer, supra note 45, at 453 (omission in original)).
48. Id. (quoting Baer, supra note 45, at 459 (italics in original)).
49. In one way, of course, Putnam's argument represents a proposed alliance of
democratic theory and religion. It was not so long ago that John Dewey argued that
all traditional religions-by which he seemed to mean all religious communities that
include a belief in a transcendent being and otherworldly rewards-were at odds with
democracy's "common faith." See John Dewey, A Common Faith (1934). Dewey's
core concern was that any religious group that focuses human attention on
otherworldly or transcendent rewards would draw energies away from the project of
social reform in the here and now. The thrust of Putnam's claim is that irrespective of
the ultimate or transcendent motives for participating in religious communities, many
churches are agencies that promote rather than detract from wider involvements in
1588 [Vol. 69
2001] SOCIAL CAPITAL AS SUBSTANTIVE MORALITY 1589
Many of the features of public policy that Glenn complains of can
be linked to values associated with the predominance of "bridging"
associations. Which is not to say that courts and policy makers have
been consciously and principally motivated by a desire to promote a
Putnamesque vision of civil society. No doubt many at least have
something like his vision of pluralism in the back of their minds.
Nonetheless, liberal democratic values such as inclusion, equality, and
individual freedom, will often support regulations and conditions on
public funding schemes that have the effect of promoting bridging
associations.
So with respect to school voucher experiments in Cleveland and
Milwaukee, it is notable that in response to concerns expressed by
courts and in legislative hearings, the receipt of publicly funded
vouchers by religious schools has been attended by the following sorts
of conditions: religious schools may decide how many students with
vouchers they wish to take, but if they are oversubscribed they cannot
pick and choose among children with vouchers on religious grounds
(they may be allowed to prefer students with siblings already enrolled,
and children who live in the school's neighborhood). In addition (in
at least one of these cities) the schools may not impose mandatory
religious exercises on children attending with vouchers. The primary
justification for these conditions is no doubt equity: if vouchers are
being publicly funded because religious schools provide a better
education than public schools, all of the community's children should
have a fair and equal chance of securing admission to those better
schools. In addition, prohibition on mandatory religious exercises
helps protect the freedom of children with vouchers.'
The further effect of these conditions is to make religious schools
that would otherwise be sect-like, bonding associations-exclusive to
the children of a particular religious community-more like inclusive
bridging associations that are open to educating all of the children in
the community. This would seem to be exactly the sort of thing Glenn
would object to. Indeed, evangelical schools in Milwaukee and
Cleveland-those that view their curriculum in pervasively religious
terms-have refused to accept children with vouchers. The conditions
that come attached to vouchers require them to do things that in
effect dampen the expression of their religious identity. By
comparison, Catholic schools have had no difficulty accepting children
under these voucher programs.5
the democratic community and the project of social reform.
50. For the Ohio voucher litigation, see Sinmmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d
834 (N.D. Ohio 1999) and Sinunons-Harris v. Zehnan, 54 F. Supp. 2d 7225 (N.D. Ohio
1999); Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999). For the Wisconsin
litigation, see Jackson v. Benson, 570 N.W.2d 407 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
51. See the stimulating critical commentary by Joe Loconte, Paying the Piper: Will
Vouchers Undermine the Mission of Religious Schools?, Pol'y Rev., Jan.-Feb. 1999, at
30,34.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
So, a bias against "sect-like" religions runs through some voucher
experiments. Other public programs have other conditions that tilt
against the qualities of bonding associations and in favor of bridging
associations. The extension of anti-discrimination requirements to
publicly funded non-profits has the effect of undermining the ability
of religious organizations to maintain their distinctiveness: it requires
these organizations to be open to hiring otherwise qualified staff
people who are not church members. Interestingly, the Salvation
Army (which has an evangelical mission) seems to have moved in this
direction without being required to. In hiring paid professional
staffers, applicants are asked if they can support the Army's ethos and
mission, but they are not required to be members of particular
churches.
The Charitable Choice provision (mentioned above) seeks to
protect religious organizations that receive public funds from having
to downplay their religious missions. It does this in part by providing
that these organizations should be able to base hiring decisions on
religious grounds. The advisability of allowing this seems to me
questionable, and more a matter of prudence than basic principle. It
is also interesting, however, that Charitable Choice also insists on
some of the same sorts of limitations on faith-based agencies that are
found in some voucher experiments: agencies may not discriminate
on religious grounds in deciding which clients to serve, and they may
not require clients to participate in religious exercises as a condition of
service. These types of limitations have made evangelical academies
unwilling to accept students with vouchers in Milwaukee and
Cleveland. 2 Thus, Charitable Choice still allows public policy to tilt
in the direction of equality and inclusion.53
Sect-like communities sometimes have their public uses. Consider
"Teen Challenge," a drug rehabilitation program that apparently
enjoys rates of success that far surpass those of secular agencies. The
agencies are staffed by "certified chemical dependency counselors"
that treat drug addiction as a "complex disease." Teen Challenge
regards drug addiction as rooted in sin, and its religious orientation is
expressed "in every detail of its work."54 The key to breaking drug
dependence, for Teen Challenge, is to develop a personal relationship
with Jesus Christ, with the support of an intensely committed group of
peers. Teen Challenge provides "a community within which recovery
is strongly valued and indeed insisted upon as the condition of
52. See id. (discussing the situation in Milwaukee).
53. See Glenn, supra note 3, at 107-10.
54. Id. at 62-63.
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continued participation. 55  Teen Challenge creates "close-knit
Christian communit[ies] ... in the intensive setting of a rural retreat,"
and insists on "[a] relatively high level of continuing participation in a
church," so that reform "becomes a habitual mode of life."'  Teen
Challenge in this way helps addicts find "a substitute purpose in
life... a whole new way of living."'"
Glenn rightly notes that federal government guidelines that reject
this approach, and that prefer a disease model of addiction (requiring
medical treatment, psychological counseling and therapy) are hardly
"neutral" with respect to the "goals and meaning of human life."" He
may well be right that government bureaucrats have unfairly ignored
the success rates of Teen Challenge in seeking to deny it government
funding (nearly 70% of Teen Challenge clients, according to a study
Glenn cites, remain free of not only drugs but alcohol and nicotine
seven years after beginning the program). Glenn may be right to urge
that, when confronting horrible and life-destroying forms of addiction,
the virtues of sects (bonding associations) should be appreciated and
accommodated on public policy grounds. In other words, Teen
Challenge may deserve government funding at least if-and it is a big
"if"-the sorts of empirical studies cited by Glenn in support of it are
sound. But this does not mean that the public policy of a liberal
democratic constitutional order will or should adopt a "neutral"
attitude toward the values that Teen Challenge stands for. The
overall purpose of the public policy of this constitutional order will
still be to prepare people to be liberal democratic citizens. And that
means promoting an overall order in which the values of bonding,
sect-like associations are, on the whole, subordinate to the virtues of
bridging associations.
CONCLUSION
I suspect that the limits on the sorts of regulations that accompany
the flow of public monies to non-profit agencies is often more a
matter of prudence than of basic principle. Any secular or religiously
based non-profit organization that finds the regulations accompanying
public funds too intrusive, too burdening to the organization's moral
or spiritual mission, is entirely free not to take the money. That is the
principal, and most deeply principled guarantee of religious freedom.
Churches and other associations are in this way entirely free to guard
their own autonomy and integrity by not participating in public
programs. Although these acts of disassociation are not costless, no
sensible view of liberty should guarantee that the exercises of rights
55. Id. at 68.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id at 69.
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are costless, or equally costly across groups. While a liberal society
should respect freedom of association, including religious association,
it need not guarantee that its institutions and policies provide a level
playing field for the different groups that compete for members in
society. Such a guarantee-which some commentators puzzlingly
seem to call for in the name of a proper governmental "neutrality"
toward religion-would be utterly impossible to realize, and socially
divisive to establish as a central public preoccupation. 9
As a matter of principle it is important that the strings that come
attached to public dollars flowing to religious non-profits are
voluntarily accepted, and justified in terms of valid and important
public purposes, such as equity, fairness, and the promotion of broad
forms of social cooperation among citizens. Conditions and
regulations should not impose huge burdens on non-profit institutions
for the sake of trivial public benefits (this is a matter of judgment).
And since there is a good case, I believe that the overall public good is
advanced by the involvement of faith-based and other non-profit
associations in social service delivery. It would be foolish to drive
them off or to undermine their effectiveness gratuitously by imposing
needless and meddlesome regulations (some of which may be
supported by self-interested public bureaucrats who would rather not
compete with non-public agencies).
But the fact is that public regulation and institutional design have a
good deal of non-neutral work to do in governing public interactions
with civil society institutions. I've written elsewhere about these
ambitions, and the long history of conflicts generated by them around
public schools and other institutions.'
I am generally in favor of the trend toward taking greater advantage
of intermediate associations and non-profit institutions in the delivery
of social services. 6' I believe that the recent preoccupation with civil
society institutions is a healthy and timely one. But we should not
59. Michael McConnell seems to call for such a form of neutrality as the baseline
for measuring the legitimate effects of public policies on religious communities.
Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 115,
169 (1992). John Tomasi also seems to want to argue for such a guarantee as a basic
requirement of "political liberalism" as he understands it. See John Tomasi,
Liberalism Beyond Justice: Citizens, Society, and the Boundaries of Political Theory
(2001).
60. See Stephen Macedo, Diversity and Distrust: Civic Education in a
Multicultural Democracy (2000); Stephen Macedo, Transformative Constitutionalism
and the Case of Religion: Defending the Moderate Hegemony of Liberalism, 26 Pol.
Theory 56 (1998) (containing a critical comment by Richard Flathman and a reply by
the author).
61. Sorting out the empirical evidence for the greater effectiveness of private non-
profit service delivery will, of course, be no easier than in the vexing area of
schooling, where researchers have been trying to measure for decades how and why
Catholic schools, for example, may perform better than public schools for some
children.
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mistake what we are up to. If it is true that we can advance public
purposes and spend tax dollars more effectively by relying on faith-
based and other private agencies to deliver social services, such as
drug rehabilitation, nursing and health care, education, and other
social services, then regulation, policy and institutional design should
be adequate to insure that our public purposes are served. Or to put it
otherwise, I sympathize with the view that the well-working of the
formal institutions of a liberal constitutional order depends on the
health of informal social institutions and associations. This seems to
me to point toward a complex public project: a project that will be
deeply non-neutral with respect to normative diversity, a project that
involves promoting-in the name of the public values associated with
liberal democratic forms of social capital-some ways of life and
making it harder to live others. The patterns of social life that support
liberal democratic forms of civic flourishing embody definite rankings
of competing human goods, which will be associated with some
versions of religious truth and not others. In this sense, the project of
promoting a healthy liberal democratic civil society is inevitably a
deeply judgmental and non-neutral project.
Notes & Observations
